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ABSTRACT
Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of
asset-pricing behavior. They indicate either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or
inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model. 
The evidence in this paper shows that the size effect, the value effect, the weekend effect,
and the dividend yield effect seem to have weakened or disappeared after the papers that highlighted
them were published. At about the same time, practitioners began investment vehicles that
implemented the strategies implied by some of these academic papers. 
The small-firm turn-of-the-year effect became weaker in the years after it was first
documented in the academic literature, although there is some evidence that it still exists.
Interestingly, however, it does not seem to exist in the portfolio returns of practitioners who focus
on small-capitalization firms. 
All of these findings raise the possibility that anomalies are more apparent than real. The
notoriety associated with the findings of unusual evidence tempts authors to further investigate
puzzling anomalies and later to try to explain them. But even if the anomalies existed in the sample
period in which they were first identified, the activities of practitioners who implement strategies
to take advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the anomalies to disappear (as research findings
cause the market to become more efficient).
G. William Schwert








Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of 
asset-pricing behavior.  They indicate either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or 
inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model.  After they are documented and analyzed in 
the academic literature, anomalies often seem to disappear, reverse, or attenuate.  This raises the 
question of whether profit opportunities existed in the past, but have since been arbitraged away, 
or whether the anomalies were simply statistical aberrations that attracted the attention of 
academics and practitioners. 
Surveys of the efficient markets literature date back at least to Fama (1970), and there are 
several recent updates, including Fama (1991) and Keim and Ziemba (2000), that stress 
particular areas of the finance literature.  By their nature, surveys reflect the views and 
perspectives of their authors, and this one will be no exception.  My goal is to highlight some 
interesting findings that have emerged from the research of many people and to raise questions 
about the implications of these findings for the way academics and practitioners use financial 
theory.
1 
There are obvious connections between this chapter and earlier chapters by Ritter (10 – 
Investment Banking and Securities Issuance) and Ferson (16 – Multifactor Pricing Models), as 
well as later chapters by Barberis and Thaler (18 – Behavioral Issues), Cochrane (20 – New 
Facts in Finance), and Easley and O’Hara (21 – Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing).  In 
fact, those chapeters draw on some of the same findings and papers that provide the basis for my 
conclusions. 
At a fundamental level, anomalies can only be defined relative to a model of “normal” 
                                                 
1This chapter is not meant to be a survey of all of the literature on market efficiency or anomalies.  Failure to 
cite particular papers should not be taken as a reflection on those papers.  
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return behavior.  Fama (1970) noted this fact early on, pointing out that tests of market efficiency 
also jointly test a maintained hypothesis about equilibrium expected asset returns.  Thus, 
whenever someone concludes that a finding seems to indicate market inefficiency, it may also be 
evidence that the underlying asset-pricing model is inadequate. 
It is also important to consider the economic relevance of a presumed anomaly.  Jensen 
(1978) stressed the importance of trading profitability in assessing market efficiency.  In 
particular, if anomalous return behavior is not definitive enough for an efficient trader to make 
money trading on it, then it is not economically significant.  This definition of market efficiency 
directly reflects the practical relevance of academic research into return behavior.  It also 
highlights the importance of transactions costs and other market microstructure issues for 
defining market efficiency. 
The growth in the amount of data and computing power available to researchers, along 
with the growth in the number of active empirical researchers in finance since Fama’s (1970) 
survey article, has created an explosion of findings that raise questions about the first, simple 
models of efficient capital markets.  Many people have noted that the normal tendency of 
researchers to focus on unusual findings (which could be a by-product of the publication process, 
if there is a bias toward the publication of findings that challenge existing theories) could lead to 
the over-discovery of “anomalies.”  For example, if a random process results in a particular 
sample that looks unusual, thereby attracting the attention of researchers, this “sample selection 
bias” could lead to the perception that the underlying model was not random.  Of course, the key 
test is whether the anomaly persists in new, independent samples.   
Some interesting questions arise when perceived market inefficiencies or anomalies seem 
to disappear after they are documented in the finance literature:  Does their disappearance reflect  
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sample selection bias, so that there was never an anomaly in the first place?  Or does it reflect the 
actions of practitioners who learn about the anomaly and trade so that profitable transactions 
vanish? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses cross-sectional 
and times-series regularities in asset returns, including the size, book-to-market, momentum, and 
dividend yield effects.  Section 3 discusses differences in returns realized by different types of 
investors, including individual investors (through closed-end funds and brokerage account 
trading data) and institutional investors (through mutual fund performance and hedge fund 
performance).  Section 4 evaluates the role of measurement issues in many of the papers that 
study anomalies, including the difficult issues associated with long-horizon return performance.  
Section 5 discusses the implications of the anomalies literature for asset-pricing theories, and 
Section 6 discusses the implications of the anomalies literature for corporate finance.  Section 7 
contains brief concluding remarks. 
2  Selected Empirical Regularities 
2.1  Predictable Differences in Returns Across Assets 
Data Snooping 
Many analysts have been concerned that the process of examining data and models 
affects the likelihood of finding anomalies.  Authors in search of an interesting research paper 
are likely to focus attention on “surprising” results.  To the extent that subsequent authors 
reiterate or refine the surprising results by examining the same or at least positively correlated 
data, there is really no additional evidence in favor of the anomaly.  Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
illustrate the data-snooping phenomenon and show how the inferences drawn from such 
exercises are misleading.  
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One obvious solution to this problem is to test the anomaly on an independent sample.  
Sometimes researchers use data from other countries, and sometimes they use data from prior 
time periods.  If sufficient time elapses after the discovery of an anomaly, the analysis of 
subsequent data also provides a test of the anomaly.  I supply some evidence below on the post-
publication performance of several anomalies. 
The Size Effect 
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) showed that small-capitalization firms on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) earned higher average returns than is predicted by the Sharpe 
(1964) – Lintner (1965) capital asset-pricing model (CAPM) from 1936-75.  This “small-firm 
effect” spawned many subsequent papers that extended and clarified the early papers.  For 
example, a special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics contained several papers that 
extended the size effect literature.
2   
Interestingly, at least some members of the financial community picked up on the small-
firm effect, since the firm Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) began in 1981 with Eugene Fama 
as its Director of Research.
3  Table 1 shows the abnormal performance of the DFA US 9-10 
Small Company Portfolio, which closely mimics the strategy described by Banz (1981). 
The measure of abnormal return α i in Table 1 is called Jensen’s (1968) alpha, from the 
following familiar model: 
 (Rit – Rft) = α i + β i (Rmt – Rft) + ε it, (1) 
where Rit is the return on the DFA fund in month t, Rft is the yield on a one-month Treasury bill, 
                                                 
2Schwert (1983) discusses all of these papers in more detail. 
 
3Information about DFA comes from their web page: http://www.dfafunds.com and from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund database. Ken French maintains current data for the Fama-French 
factors on his web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.   
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and Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq 
stocks.  The intercept α i in (1) measures the average difference between the monthly return to the 
DFA fund and the return predicted by the CAPM.  The market risk of the DFA fund, measured 
by β i, is insignificantly different from 1.0 in the period January 1982 – May 2002, as well as in 
each of the three subperiods, 1982-1987, 1988-1993, and 1994-2002.  The estimates of abnormal 
monthly returns are between  -0.2% and 0.4% per month, although none are reliably below zero. 
Thus, it seems that the small-firm anomaly has disappeared since the initial publication of 
the papers that discovered it.  Alternatively, the differential risk premium for small-capitalization 
stocks has been much smaller since 1982 than it was during the period 1926-1982.  
The Turn-of-the-Year Effect 
Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983) showed that much of the abnormal return to small  
firms  (measured relative  to the CAPM) occurs during the first two weeks in January.  This 
anomaly became known as the “turn-of-the-year effect.”  Roll (1983) hypothesized that the 
higher volatility of small-capitalization stocks caused more of them to experience substantial 
short-term capital losses that investors might want to realize for income tax purposes before the 
end of the year.  This selling pressure might reduce prices of small-cap stocks in December, 




                                                 
4There are many mechanisms that could mitigate the size of such an effect, including the choice of a tax year different from a calendar 
year, the incentive to establish short-term losses before December, and the opportunities for other investors to earn higher returns by 
providing liquidity in December.  
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Table 1 
Size and Value Effects, January 1982 – May 2002 
Performance of DFA US 9-10 Small Company Portfolio relative to the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks (Rm) and the one-month Treasury bill yield (Rf), 
January 1982 – May 2002.  The intercept in this regression, α i, is known as “Jensen’s alpha” 
(1968) and it measures the average difference between the monthly return to the DFA fund and 
the return predicted by the CAPM. 
 
(Rit – Rft) = α i + β i (Rmt – Rft) + ε it 
 
The last row shows the performance of the DFA US 6-10 Value Portfolio from January 1994 – 
May 2002.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics. 
 
Sample Period  α i t(α i  = 0)  β i t(β i = 1) 
 
DFA 9-10 Small Company Portfolio 
1982-2002 0.0020  0.67  1.033  0.68 
1982-1987 -0.0019  -0.44  1.000  0.00 
1988-1993 0.0038  0.80  1.104  1.21 
1994-2002 0.0035  0.66  1.013  0.15 
 
DFA US 6-10 Value Portfolio 
1994-2002 -0.0022  -0.59  0.816  -2.14 
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Table 2 shows estimates of the turn-of-the-year effect for the period 1962-2001, as well 
as for the 1962-1979 period analyzed by Reinganum (1983), and the subsequent 1980-1989 and 
1990-2001 sample periods.  The dependent variable is the difference in the daily return to the 
CRSP NYSE small-firm portfolio (decile 1) and the return to the CRSP NYSE large-firm 
portfolio (decile 10), (R1t  - R10t).  The independent variable, January, equals one when the daily 
return occurs during the first 15 calendar days of January, and zero otherwise.  Thus, the 
coefficient  α J measures the difference between the average daily return during the first 15 
calendar days of January and the rest of the year.  If small firms earn higher average returns than 
large firms during the first half of January, α J should be reliably positive. 
Unlike the results in Table 1, it does not seem that the turn-of-the-year anomaly has 
completely disappeared since it was originally documented.  The estimates of the turn-of-the-
year coefficient α J are around 0.4% per day over the periods 1980-1989 and 1990-2001, which is 
about half the size of the estimate over the 1962-1979 period of 0.8%.  Thus, while the effect is 
smaller than observed by Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983), it is still reliably positive. 
Interestingly, Booth and Keim (2000) have shown that the turn-of-the-year anomaly is 
not reliably different from zero in the returns to the DFA 9-10 portfolio over the period 1982-
1995.  They conclude that the restrictions placed on the DFA fund (no stocks trading at less than 
$2 per share or with less than $10 million in equity capitalization, and no stocks whose IPO was 
less than one year ago) explain the difference between the behavior of the CRSP small-firm 
portfolio and the DFA portfolio.  Thus, it is the lowest-priced and least-liquid stocks that 
apparently explain the turn-of-the-year anomaly.  This raises the possibility that market 
microstructure effects, especially the costs of illiquidity, play an important role in explaining 




Small Firm/Turn-of-the-Year Effect, Daily Returns, 1962-2001 
 
(R1t  - R10t) = α 0 + α J  Januaryt + ε t 
 
R1t is the return to the CRSP NYSE small-firm portfolio (decile 1) and R10t is the return to the 
CRSP NYSE large-firm portfolio (decile 10).  January = 1 when the daily return occurs during 
the first 15 calendar days of January, and zero otherwise.  The coefficient of January measures 
the difference in average return between small- and large-firm portfolios during the first two 
weeks of the year versus other days in the year.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
used to compute the t-statistics. 
 
Sample Period  α 0 t(α 0  = 0)  α J t(α J = 0) 
 
1962-2001 -0.00007 -0.92 0.00641  9.87 
1962-1979 0.00009 0.97  0.00815 7.14 
1980-1989 -0.00014 -0.73 0.00433  4.55 




The Weekend Effect 
French (1980) observed another calendar anomaly.  He noted that the average return to 
the Standard & Poor's (S&P) composite portfolio was reliably negative over weekends in the 
period 1953-1977.  Table 3 shows estimates of the weekend effect from February 1885 to May 
2002, as well as for the 1953-1977 period analyzed by French (1980) and the 1885-1927, 1928-
1952, and 1978-2002 sample periods not included in French’s study.  The dependent variable is 
the daily return to a broad portfolio of U.S. stocks.  For the 1885-1927 period, the Schwert 
(1990) portfolio based on Dow Jones indexes is used.  For 1928-2002, the S&P composite  
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portfolio is used.  The independent variable, Weekend, equals one when the daily return spans a 
weekend (e.g., Friday to Monday), and zero otherwise.  Thus, the coefficient α W measures the 
difference between the average daily return over weekends and the other days of the week.  If 
weekend returns are reliably lower than returns on other days of the week, α W should be reliably 
negative (and the sum of α 0 + α W should be reliably negative to confirm French’s (1980) 
results). 
The results for 1953-1977 replicate the results in French (1980).  The estimate of the 
weekend effect for 1928-1952 is even more negative, as previously noted by Keim and 
Stambaugh (1984).  The estimate of the weekend effect from 1885-1927 is smaller, about half 
the size for 1953-1977 and about one-third the size for 1928-1952, but  still reliably negative.  
Interestingly, the estimate of the weekend effect since 1978 is not reliably different from the 
other days of the week.  While the point estimate of α W is negative from 1978-2002, it is about 
one-quarter as large as the estimate for 1953-1977, and it is not reliably less than zero.  The 
estimate of the average return over weekends is the sum α 0 + α W, which is essentially zero for 
1978-2002. 
Thus, like the size effect, the weekend effect seems to have disappeared, or at least 
substantially attenuated, since it was first documented in 1980. 
The Value Effect 
Around the same time as early size effect papers, Basu (1977, 1983) noted that firms with 
high earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios earn positive abnormal returns relative to the CAPM.  Many 
subsequent papers have noted that positive abnormal returns seem to accrue to portfolios of 
stocks with high dividend yields (D/P) or to stocks with high book-to-market (B/M) values.   
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Table 3 
Day-of-the-Week Effects in the U.S. Stock Returns,  
February 1885 – May 2002 
 
Rt  = α 0 + α W Weekendt + ε t 
Weekend = 1 when the return spans Sunday (e.g., Friday to Monday), and zero otherwise.  The 
coefficient of Weekend measures the difference in average return over the weekend versus other 
days of the week.  From 1885-1927, Dow Jones portfolios are used (see Schwert (1990)).  From 
1928-May 2002, the Standard & Poor’s composite portfolio is used.  Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics. 
 
Sample Period  α 0 t(α 0  = 0)  α W t(α W = 0) 
        
1885-2002 0.0005 8.52  -0.0017  -10.13 
1885-1927 0.0004 4.46  -0.0013  -4.96 
1928-1952 0.0007 3.64  -0.0030  -6.45 
1953-1977 0.0007 6.80  -0.0023  -8.86 
1978-2002 0.0005 4.00  -0.0005  -1.37 
 
 
Ball (1978) made the important observation that such evidence was likely to indicate a 
fault in the CAPM rather than market inefficiency, because the characteristics that would cause a 
trader following this strategy to add a firm to his or her portfolio would be stable over time and 
easy to observe.  In other words, turnover and transactions costs would be low and information 
collection costs would be low.  If such a strategy earned reliable “abnormal” returns, it would be 
available to a large number of potential arbitrageurs at a very low cost. 
More recently, Fama and French (1992, 1993) have argued that size and value (as 
measured by the book-to-market value of common stock) represent two risk factors that are  
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missing from the CAPM.  In particular, they suggest using regressions of the form: 
 (Rit – Rft) = α i + β i (Rmt – Rft) + si SMBt + hi HMLt + ε it (2) 
to measure abnormal performance, α i.  In (2), SMB represents the difference between the returns 
to portfolios of small- and large-capitalization firms, holding constant the B/M ratios for these 
stocks, and HML represents the difference between the returns to portfolios of high and low B/M 
ratio firms, holding constant the capitalization for these stocks.  Thus, the regression coefficients 
si and hi represent exposures to size and value risk in much the same way that β i measures the 
exposure to market risk. 
Fama and French (1993) used their three-factor model to explore several of the anomalies 
that have been identified in earlier literature, where the test of abnormal returns is based on 
whether α i = 0 in (2).  They found that abnormal returns from the three-factor model in (2) are 
not reliably different from zero for portfolios of stocks sorted by: equity capitalization, B/M 
ratios, dividend yield, or earnings-to-price ratios.  The largest deviations from their three-factor 
model occur in the portfolio of low B/M (i.e., growth) stocks, where small-capitalization stocks 
have returns that are too low and large-capitalization stocks have returns that are too high (α i > 
0). 
Fama and French (1996) extended the use of their three-factor model to explain the 
anomalies studied by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994).  They found no estimates of 
abnormal performance in (2) that are reliably different from zero based on variables such as 
B/M, E/P, cash flow over price (C/P), and the rank of past sales growth rates.   
In 1993, Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) began a mutual fund that focuses on small 
firms with high B/M ratios (the DFA US 6-10 Value Portfolio).  Based on the results in Fama 
and French (1993), this portfolio would have earned significantly positive “abnormal” returns of  
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about 0.5% per month over the period 1963-1991 relative to the CAPM.  The estimate of the 
abnormal return to the DFA Value portfolio from 1994-2002 in the last row of Table 1 is -0.2% 
per month, with a t-statistic of -0.59.  Thus, as with the DFA US 9-10 Small Company Portfolio, 
the apparent anomaly that motivated the fund’s creation seems to have disappeared, or at least 
attenuated. 
Davis, Fama, and French (2000) collected and analyzed B/M data from 1929 through 
1963 to study a sample that does not overlap the data studied in Fama and French (1993).  They 
found that the apparent premium associated with value stocks is similar in the pre-1963 data to 
the post-1963 evidence.  They also found that the size effect is subsumed by the value effect in 
the earlier sample period.  Fama and French (1998) have shown that the value effect exists in a 
sample covering 13 countries (including the U.S.) over the period 1975-1995.  Thus, in samples 
that pre-date the publication of the original Fama and French (1993) paper, the evidence supports 
the existence of a value effect. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) have argued that size and M/B characteristics dominate the 
Fama-French size and B/M risk factors in explaining the cross-sectional pattern of average 
returns.  They conclude that size and M/B are not risk factors in an equilibrium pricing model.  
However, Davis, Fama, and French (2000) found that Daniel and Titman’s results do not hold up 
outside their sample period.  
The Momentum Effect 
Fama and French (1996) have also tested two versions of momentum strategies.   
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) found an anomaly whereby past losers (stocks with low returns in 
the past three to five years) have higher average returns than past winners (stocks with high 
returns in the past three to five years), which is a “contrarian” effect.  On the other hand,  
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that recent past winners (portfolios formed on the last year 
of past returns) out-perform recent past losers, which is a “continuation” or “momentum” effect.  
Using their three-factor model in (2), Fama and French found no estimates of abnormal 
performance that are reliably different from zero based on the long-term reversal strategy of 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985), which they attribute to the similarity of past losers and small 
distressed firms.  On the other hand, Fama and French are not able to explain the short-term 
momentum effects found by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) using their three-factor model.  The 
estimates of abnormal returns are strongly positive for short-term winners. 
Table 4 shows estimates of the momentum effect using both the CAPM benchmark in (1) 
and the Fama-French three-factor benchmark in (2).  The measure of momentum is the 
difference between the returns to portfolios of high and low prior return firms, UMD, where 
prior returns are measured over months -2 to -13 relative to the month in question.
5  The sample 
periods shown are the 1965-1989 period used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the 1927-1964 
period that preceded their sample, the 1990-2001 period that occurred after their paper was 
published, and the overall 1927-2001 period.  Compared with the CAPM benchmark in the top 
panel of Table 4, the momentum effect seems quite large and reliable.  The intercept α  is about 
1% per month, with t-statistics between 2.7 and 7.0.  In fact, the smallest estimate of abnormal 
returns occurs in the 1965-1989 period used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the largest 
estimate occurs in the 1990-2001 sample after their paper was published.
6 
                                                 
5This Fama-French momentum factor for the period 1927-2001 is available from Ken French’s web site, 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ftp/F-F_Momentum_Factor.zip.  
6Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) also show that the momentum effect remains large in the post 1989 period.  They 





Momentum Effects, 1927 – 2001 
 
UMDt = α  + β  (Rmt – Rft) + s SMBt + h HMLt + ε t 
UMDt is the return to a portfolio that is long stocks with high returns and short stocks with low returns in 
recent months (months -13 through -2).  The market risk premium is measured as the difference in return 
between the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks (Rm) and the one-month 
Treasury bill yield (Rf).  SMBt is the difference between the returns to portfolios of small- and large-
capitalization firms, holding constant the B/M ratios for these stocks, and HMLt is the difference 
between the returns to portfolios of high and low B/M ratio firms, holding constant the capitalization for 





Size, T  α  t(α =0)  β  t(β =0) s t(s=0)  h t(h=0) 
Single-Factor CAPM Benchmark 
1926-
2001  900 0.0095 6.98  -0.280  -3.48         
1926-
1964  456 0.0100 5.33  -0.415  -4.06         
1965-
1989  300 0.0082 4.00  0.016 0.22         
1926-
1989  756 0.0091 6.37  -0.303  -3.50         
1990-
2001  144 0.0107 2.71  -0.063  -0.56         
Three-Factor Fama-French Benchmark 
1926-
2001  900 0.0110 8.25  -0.193  -3.75  -0.102  -1.14 -0.484 -4.65 
1926-
1964  456 0.0103 5.72  -0.204  -3.45  -0.137  -0.95 -0.525 -3.67 
1965-
1989  300 0.0100 4.61  -0.010  -0.13  -0.132  -1.17 -0.276 -2.08 
1926-
1989  756 0.0107 7.77  -0.170  -3.27  -0.128  -1.25 -0.519 -4.50 
1990-
2001  144 0.0123 2.95  -0.201  -1.83  0.093  0.54 -0.245 -1.35 
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Fama and French (1996) noted that their three-factor model does not explain the 
momentum effect, since the intercepts in the bottom panel of Table 4 are all reliably positive.  In 
fact, the intercepts from the three-factor models are larger than from the single-factor CAPM 
model in the upper panel. 
Lewellen (2002) has presented evidence that portfolios of stocks sorted on size and B/M 
characteristics have similar momentum effects as those seen by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 
2001) and Fama and French (1996).  He argues that the existence of momentum in large 
diversified portfolios makes it unlikely that behavioral biases in information processing are likely 
to explain the evidence on momentum. 
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) found that size and B/M characteristics do 
not explain differences in average returns, given the Fama and French three-factor model.  Like 
Fama and French (1996), they found that the Fama-French model does not explain the 
momentum effect.  Finally, they found a negative relation between average returns and recent 
past dollar trading volume.  They argue that this reflects a relation between expected returns and 
liquidity as suggested by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996). 
Thus, while many of the systematic differences in average returns across stocks can be 
explained by the three-factor characterization of Fama and French (1993), momentum cannot.  
Interestingly, the average returns to index funds that were created to mimic the size and value 
strategies discussed above have not matched up to the historical estimates, as shown in Table 1.  
The evidence on the momentum effect seems to persist, but may reflect predictable variation in 
risk premiums that are not yet understood.  
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2.2  Predictable Differences in Returns Through Time 
In the early years of the efficient markets literature, the random walk model, in which 
returns should not be autocorrelated, was often confused with the hypothesis of market efficiency 
(see, for example, Black (1971)).  Fama (1970, 1976) made clear that the assumption of constant 
equilibrium expected returns over time is not a part of the efficient markets hypothesis, although 
that assumption worked well as a rough approximation in many of the early efficient markets 
tests.   
Since then, many papers have documented a small degree of predictability in stock 
returns based on prior information.  Examples include Fama and Schwert (1977) [short-term 
interest rates], Keim and Stambaugh (1986) [spreads between high-risk corporate bond yields 
and short-term interest rates], Campbell (1987) [spreads between long- and short-term interest 
rates], French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) [stock volatility], Fama and French (1988) 
[dividend yields on aggregate stock portfolios], and Kothari and Shanken (1997) [book-to-
market ratios on aggregate stock portfolios].  Recently, Baker and Wurgler (2000) have shown 
that the proportion of new securities issues that are equity issues is a negative predictor of future 
equity returns over the period 1928-1997. 
An obvious question given evidence of the time-series predictability of returns is whether 
this is evidence of market inefficiency, or simply evidence of time-varying equilibrium expected 
returns.  Fama and Schwert (1977) found weak evidence that excess returns to the CRSP value-
weighted portfolio of NYSE stocks (in excess of the one-month Treasury bill yield) are 
predictably negative.  Many subsequent papers have used similar metrics to judge whether the 
evidence of time variation in expected returns seems to imply profitable trading strategies.  I am 
not aware of a paper that claims to find strong evidence that excess stock returns have been  
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predictably negative, although that may be an extreme standard for defining market inefficiency 
since it ignores risk. 
Short-Term Interest Rates, Expected Inflation, and Stock Returns 
Using data from 1953-1971, Fama and Schwert (1977) documented a reliable negative 
relation between aggregate stock returns and short-term interest rates.  Since Fama (1975) had 
shown that most of the variation in short-term interest rates was due to variation in expected 
inflation rates during this period, Fama and Schwert concluded that expected stock returns are 
negatively related to expected inflation. 
Table 5 shows estimates of the relation between stock returns and short-term interest 
rates or expected inflation rates for the period January 1831 - May 2002, as well as for the 1953-
1971 period analyzed by Fama and Schwert (1977).  The dependent variable Rmt is the monthly 
return to an aggregate stock portfolio (based on the Schwert (1990) data for 1831-1925 and the 
CRSP value-weighted portfolio for 1926-2001, and the Standard & Poor’s composite for 2002), 
 R mt  = α  + γ  Rft + ε t, (3) 
where Rft is the yield on a short-term low-risk security (commercial paper yields from 1831-1925 
and Treasury yields from 1926-2002).
7  The negative relation between expected stock returns 
and short-term interest rates is strongest for the 1953-1971 period, but the estimate is negative in 
all of the sample periods in Table 5, and it is reliably different from zero over 1831-1925.  The t-
statistic for 1972-2002 is -1.08. 
It is common to use the average difference between the return from a large portfolio of 
stocks and the yield on a short-term bond (Rmt – Rft) as an estimate of the market risk premium 
                                                 
7Schwert (1989) describes the sources and methods used to derive the short-term interest rate series.  
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(e.g., Ibbotson Associates (1998) and Brealey and Myers (2000)).  This model of the market risk 
premium implies that the coefficient of Rft in (3) should be 1.0, so that the negative estimates are 
even more surprising.  For example, the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficient of Rft 
equals 1.0 for 1972-2002 is -2.03. 
Table 5 also shows estimates of the relation between stock returns and two measures of 
the expected inflation rate, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer Price Index 
(PPI).  The model for expected inflation uses a regression of the inflation rate on the short-term 
interest rate with ARMA(1,1) errors, 
 PPIt  = α 0 + γ 0 TBt +  [(1 - θ L) / [(1 - φ L)] ε t,   (4) 
where L is the lag operator, L
kXt = Xt-k, estimated using the most recent 120 months of data to 
forecast inflation in month t+1.
8  It is notable that the negative relation with stock returns is 
stronger for the interest rate Rft than for either measure of the expected inflation rate, even 
though Rft is a part of the prediction model for inflation.  This shows that the interest rate is not a 
close proxy for the expected inflation rate outside the 1953-1971 period.  It also shows that the 
negative relation between stock returns and short-term interest rates is not always due to 
expected inflation. 
Thus, the apparent ability of short-term interest rates to predict stock returns is strongest 
in the period used by Fama and Schwert (1977).  Nevertheless, it does seem that excess returns 
on stocks are negatively related to interest rates, suggesting a slowly time-varying market risk 
premium.  If the market risk premium varies because of underlying economic fundamentals, this 
is not an anomaly that would allow investors to trade to make abnormal profits. 
                                                 
8This model is similar the model used by Nelson and Schwert (1977) to model the CPI inflation rate from 1953-




Relation between Stock Market Returns and Short-Term  
Interest Rates or Expected Inflation, January 1831 - May 2002 
 
Rmt  = α  + γ  Xt + ε t 
 
Xt = Rft, E(PPIt), or E(CPIt).  Rft is the yield on a one-month security (commercial paper from 
1831-1925 and Treasury securities from 1926-2002).  E(PPIt) is the one-month-ahead forecast 
from a predictive model for PPI inflation: 
 
PPIt  = α 0 + γ 0 Rft +  [(1 - θ L) / [(1 - φ L)] ε t, 
 
which is a regression of PPI inflation on the short-term interest rate with ARMA(1,1) errors 
estimated with the prior 120 months of data.  Similarly, E(CPIt) is the one-month-ahead forecast 
from a predictive model for CPI inflation.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in 






















































a120 PPI observations are used to create the forecasting model, so the sample size from 1831-2002 is 1,932 and 
from 1831-1925 it is 1,015. 
 
bCPI data are available from 1913-2002, and 120 observations are used to create the forecasting model, so the 
sample size from 1831-2002 is 952.  
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Dividend Yields and Stock Returns 
Using CRSP data for the period 1927-1986, Fama and French (1988) showed that 
aggregate dividend yields predict subsequent stock returns.  Many subsequent papers have 
amplified this finding and several have questioned aspects of the statistical procedures used, 
including Goyal and Welch (1999).  Table 6 reproduces some of the main results from Fama and 
French (1988), but also uses the Cowles (1939) data for 1872-1926 and additional CRSP data for 
1987-2000.  The equation estimated by Fama and French is, 
  r(t, t+T)  = α  + δ  Y(t) + ε (t, t+T),  (5) 
where Y(t) = D(t)/P(t-1), P(t) is the price at time t, D(t) is the dividend for the year preceding t, 
and r(t, t+T)  is the continuously compounded nominal  return from  t  to the slope estimates are 
much smaller and the explanatory power of the models (R
2) is negligible. t+T. 
What is clear from Table 6 is that the incremental data both before and after the 1927-
1986 period studied by Fama and French shows a much weaker relation between aggregate 
dividend yields and subsequent stock returns.  None of the t-statistics for the slope coefficient 
δ  are larger than 2.0, even for the 1872-2000 sample which includes the 1927-1986 data used by 
Fama and French (about half of the sample).  This occurs because the slope estimates are much 
smaller and the explanatory power of the models (R





Relation between Stock Market Returns and 
Aggregate Dividend Yields, 1872-2000 
r(t, t+T)  = α  + δ  Y(t) + ε (t, t+T) 
 
P(t) is the price at time t.  Y(t) equals either D(t)/P(t) or D(t)/P(t-1), where D(t) is the dividend 
for the year preceding t.  r(t, t+T) is the continuously compounded nominal return from t to t+T 
to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio from 1926-2000 and to the Cowles portfolio from 1872-
1925.  The regressions for two-, three- and four-year returns use overlapping annual 
observations.  The t-statistics t(δ)  use heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
error estimates.  R
2 is the coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom, and S(ε ) 






Y(t) = D(t) / P(t) 
 
Y(t) = D(t) / P(t-1) 
  δ   t(δ)   R
2  S(ε )  δ   t(δ)   R
2  S(ε ) 
 
1927-1986, N = 60 
 
1  2.21 1.00  0.01 0.21 5.25 3.03  0.07  0.20
2  6.88 2.78  0.08 0.30 8.85 3.53  0.09  0.29
3  9.28 3.23  0.12 0.33  11.25 3.82  0.12  0.33
4  12.05 4.00  0.16 0.36  12.55 4.54  0.12  0.37
 
1872-2000, N = 129 
 
1  0.53 0.52  -0.01 0.18 1.27 1.16  0.00  0.18
2  2.03 1.44  0.01 0.26 1.11 0.66 -0.01  0.26
3  2.30 1.33  0.00 0.30 2.17 1.04  0.00  0.30
4  3.87 1.83  0.02 0.34 3.40 1.42  0.01  0.34
 
1872-1926, N = 55 
 
1  0.84 0.64  -0.01  0.16 0.55 0.29 -0.02  0.16
2 2.29  1.20  0.00  0.22  -1.14 -0.47  -0.02  0.22
3  1.49 0.70  -0.01  0.24 1.16 0.42 -0.02  0.24
4  3.51 1.40  0.01  0.28 4.48 1.39  0.01  0.28
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Fig. 1 illustrates the limitations of the dividend yield model for predicting stock returns.  
Fig. 1a shows the predictions of stock returns from the model based on lagged dividend yield, 
D(t)/P(t-1), for a one-year horizon based on estimates for 1927-1986 (the top row in the right-
hand panel of Table 6).  It also shows the one-year return to short-term commercial paper and 
Treasury securities.  The model for 1927-1986 is used to predict stock returns both before and 
after the estimation sample, for the 1872-2000 period.  Until 1961, the predicted stock return is 
always higher than the interest rate.  However, starting in 1990, the predicted stock return is 
always below the interest rate.
 9 
Fig. 1b shows the investment results that would have occurred from following a strategy 
of investing in short-term bonds, rather than stocks, when the dividend yield model in Table 6 
predicts stock returns lower than interest rates.  Both that strategy and a benchmark buy-and-hold 
strategy start with a $1,000 investment in 1872.  By the end of 1999, the buy-and-hold strategy is 
worth almost $6.7 million, whereas the dividend yield asset allocation strategy is worth just over 
$2.2 million.  This large difference reflects the high stock returns during the 1990s when the 
dividend yield model would have predicted low stock returns.  In short, the out-of-sample 
prediction performance of this model would have been disastrous.
10  
In Chapter 20, Cochrane discusses return predictability in returns in relation to various 
indicators, such as yield spreads, dividend yields, and momentum.  Again, if market returns vary 
because of underlying economic fundamentals, this is not an anomaly that would allow investors 
to trade to make abnormal profits. 
                                                 
9Campbell and Shiller (1998) also stress the pessimistic implications of low aggregate dividend yields and 
apparently followed the advice of their model (Wall Street Journal, January 13, 1997). 
10Of course, it is possible that a less extreme asset allocation model that reduced exposure to stocks when 






















Fig 1a.  Predictions of stock returns based on lagged dividend yields, D(t)/P(t-1), and the 

























Fig 1b.  Value of $1 invested in stocks (“buy-and-hold”) versus a strategy based on predictions 
of stock returns from a regression on lagged dividend yields, D(t)/P(t-1), from 1927-1986.  When 
predicted stock returns exceed interest rates, invest in stocks for that year.  When predicted stock 
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3  Returns to Different Types of Investors 
3.1 Individual  Investors 
One simple corollary of the efficient markets hypothesis is that uninformed investors 
should be able to earn “normal” rates of return.  It should be just as hard to select stocks that will 
under-perform as to select stocks that will out-perform the market, otherwise, a strategy of short-
selling or similarly taking opposite positions would earn above-normal returns.  Of course, 
investors who trade too much and incur unnecessary and unproductive transactions costs should 
earn below-normal returns net of these costs.   
Odean (1999) examined data from 10,000 individual accounts randomly selected from a 
large national discount brokerage firm for the period 1987-1993.  This sample covers over 
160,000 trades.  Because the data source is a discount brokerage firm, recommendations from a 
retail broker are presumably not the source of information used by investors to make trading 
decisions.  Odean found that traders lower their returns through trading, even ignoring 
transactions costs, because the stocks they sell earn higher subsequent returns than the stocks 
they purchase. 
Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) used different data from the same discount brokerage 
firm and found that active trading accounts earn lower risk-adjusted net returns than less-active 
accounts.  They have also found that men trade more actively than women and thus earn lower 
risk-adjusted net returns and that the stocks that individual investors buy subsequently under-
perform the stocks that they sell. 
The results in these papers are anomalies, but not because trading costs reduce net 
returns, or because men trade more often than women.  They are anomalies because it seems that 
these individual investors can identify stocks that will systematically under-perform the Fama- 
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French three-factor model in (2).  One potential clue in Odean (1999) is that these investors tend 
to sell stocks that have risen rapidly in the recent weeks, suggesting that the subsequent good 
performance of these stocks is due to the momentum effect described earlier.  By going against 
momentum, these individual investors may be earning lower returns. 
Closed-End Funds  
The closed-end fund puzzle has been recognized for many years.  Closed-end funds 
generally trade in organized secondary trading markets, such as the NYSE.  Since marketable 
securities of other firms constitute most of the assets of closed-end funds, it is relatively easy to 
observe both the value of the stock of the closed-end fund and the value of its assets.  On 
average, in most periods, the fund trades at less than the value of its underlying assets, which 
leads to the “closed-end fund discount” anomaly.   
Thompson (1978) was one of the first to carefully show that closed-end fund discounts 
could be used to predict above-normal returns to the shares of closed-end funds.  Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler (1991) argued that the time-series behavior of closed-end fund discounts is driven by 
investor sentiment, with discounts shrinking when individual investors are optimistic.  They 
found that discounts shrink at the same time that returns to small-capitalization stocks are 
relatively high. 
Pontiff (1995) updated and extended Thompson’s tests and found that the abnormal 
returns to closed-end funds are due to mean reversion in the discount, not to unusual returns to 
the assets held by the funds.  In other words, when the prices of closed-end fund shares depart 
too much from their asset values, the difference tends to grow smaller, leading to higher-than-
average returns to these shares. 
Since the anomaly here pertains to the prices of the closed-end fund shares, not to the  
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underlying investment portfolios, and since closed-end fund shares are predominantly held by 
individual investors, this evidence sheds light on the investment performance of some individual 
investors. 
 3.2  Institutional Investors 
Studies of the investment performance of institutional investors date back at least to 
Cowles (1933).  Cowles concluded that professional money managers did not systematically 
outperform a passive index fund strategy (although he did not use the term “index fund”).  There 
is an extensive literature studying the returns to large samples of open-end mutual funds and, 
more recently, to private hedge funds.   
Mutual Funds  
Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) have found short-run persistence in mutual fund 
performance, although the strongest evidence is of a “cold-hands” phenomenon whereby poor 
performance seems more likely to persist than would be true by random chance. 
Malkiel (1995) studied a database from Lipper that includes all open-end equity funds 
that existed in each year of the period 1971-1991.  Unlike many mutual fund databases that 
retroactively omit funds that go out of business or merge, Malkiel’s data do not suffer from the 
survivorship bias stressed by Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992).  Malkiel found that 
mutual funds earn gross returns that are consistent with the CAPM in equation (1) and net returns 
that are inferior because of the expenses of active management.  He also found evidence of 
performance persistence for the 1970s, but not for the 1980s. 
Carhart (1997) also used a mutual fund database that is free of survivorship bias and 
found that the persistence identified by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) is explainable 
by the momentum effect for individual stocks described earlier.  After taking this into account,  
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the only evidence of persistent performance of open-end funds is that poorly performing 
managers have “cold hands.” 
Hedge Funds  
The problem of assessing performance for hedge funds is complicated by the unusual 
strategies used by many of these funds.  Fung and Hsieh (1997) showed that hedge fund returns 
are not well characterized as fixed linear combinations of traditional asset classes, similar to the 
Fama-French three-factor model.  Because of changing leverage, contingent claims, and frequent 
changes in investment positions, traditional fund performance measures are of dubious value. 
Returns to IPOs  
The large returns available to investors who can purchase stocks in underwritten firm-
commitment initial public offerings (IPOs) at the offering price have been the subject of many 
papers, dating at least to Ibbotson (1975).  Most of the literature on high average initial returns to 
IPOs focuses on the implied underpricing of the IPO stock and the effects on the issuing firm, 
but this evidence has equivalent implications for abnormal profits to IPO investors.  Several 
theories have been developed to explain the systematic underpricing of IPO stocks (see Ritter’s 
Chapter 10).  Many of these theories point to the difficulty of individual investors in acquiring 
the most underpriced of IPOs, which is why I include this discussion in the section under returns 
to institutional investors. 
How large are the returns to IPO investing?  Fig. 2a shows the cumulative value of a 
strategy of investing $1,000 starting in January 1960 in a random sample of IPOs, selling after 
one month, and then re-investing in a new set of IPOs in the next month.  The returns to IPOs are 
from Ibbotson, Ritter, and Sindelar (1994) and are updated on Jay Ritter’s website 
[http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm].  For comparison, Fig. 2a also shows the value of  
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investing in the CRSP value-weighted portfolio over the same period.  By December 2001, the 
CRSP portfolio is worth about $74,000.  On the other hand, the IPO portfolio strategy is worth 
over $533x10
33.  Clearly, no one has been able to follow this strategy, or people like Bill Gates 
and Warren Buffet would be viewed as rank amateurs in the wealth-creation business! 
What are the impediments to IPO investing as a strategy for earning abnormal returns?  
First, it is difficult to be included in the allocations made by the underwriters.  Investment banks 
usually allocate shares first to large institutional customers (see, e.g., Wall Street Journal, 
January 27, 2000).  If the institutional customers can distinguish between deals that are more 
underpriced and those that are less underpriced, then the shares available to individual investors 
are likely to offer lower initial returns.  It has also been alleged that in exchange for potential 
favors (“spinning”), investment banks allocate shares to preferred individual clients such as 
politicians, including House Speaker Thomas Foley (Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1993) and 
Senator Alphonse D’Amato, a prominent member of the Senate Banking Committee (Wall Street 
Journal, June 6, 1996), or to the executives of private firms that are considering going public in 
the near future (see, e.g., Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1997).  Thus, a typical individual 
investor would have difficulty acquiring shares in the IPOs that are most underpriced. 
Second, many investment banks discourage the practice of buying shares in an IPO and 
then selling the shares in the secondary market (“flipping”).  Forcing IPO investors to hold 
shares for more than a month, for example, would increase the risk and costs of pursuing the IPO 
strategy outlined above (although it would still seem extremely profitable).  To the extent that 
underwriters sometimes provide informal price support in the after-market by buying shares at a 
price close to the IPO price, it is clear why they would want to discourage flipping when initial 
returns are negative.  On the other hand, when the after-market price rises dramatically and  
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volume is high, flipping is beneficial to the underwriter by increasing market-maker profits.  It is 
necessary for some investors who purchased shares in the IPO to sell their shares to create a 
public float and therefore liquidity.  Indeed, there has been recent acknowledgement that flipping 
is useful in helping to create liquidity (see, e.g., Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2000). 
Another unusual feature of IPO returns is their apparent persistence, shown in Fig. 2b.  
While average IPO returns are positive in almost every month from 1960 to 2001, there seem to 
be very noticeable cycles in these returns, with high returns following high returns and vice 
versa.  According to Lowry and Schwert (2002), these cycles are explained by two important 
factors.  First, the types of firms that go public tend to be clustered in time, so that cross-
sectional differences in IPO returns that may be due to information asymmetry, for example, 
show up in average returns across IPOs.  Second, the learning that occurs during the registration 
period (as underwriters talk to potential investors) affects IPO prices and subsequent returns for 
the similar-type firms that are in the IPO process at the same time, and this process usually lasts 
more than one month.  Lowry and Schwert argue that firms cannot use the persistence in IPO 
returns shown in Fig. 2b to optimally time their IPOs (trying to minimize initial returns).  By 
analogy, investors cannot time their participation in the IPO market (trying to maximize their 
returns). 
Thus, while IPOs seem to offer large abnormal returns to investors who can obtain shares 


























































































































































































































































































Fig. 2a.  Value each month of $1,000 invested in January 1960 in a random sample of IPOs.  At 
the end of each month, the IPO stocks are sold and the proceeds invested in a new sample of 
IPOs in the next month.  The scale is logarithmic and the December 2001 value of the IPO 
Strategy is over $533x10
33.  For comparison, the strategy of investing $1,000 in the CRSP value-





















Fig. 2b.  Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter’s (1994) monthly data on the average initial returns to 
IPO investors, January 1960 to December 2001.  
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3.3  Limits to Arbitrage 
It has long been recognized that transactions costs can limit the ability of traders to profit 
from mispricing (e.g., Jensen (1978)).  The question of how market frictions affect asset prices 
and allow apparent anomalies to persist has received increasing attention in recent years.   
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have argued that agency problems associated with 
professional money managers, along with transactions costs, can cause mispricing to persist and 
that many anomalies are a result of such market frictions.  Pontiff (1996) has shown that the 
absolute value of closed-end fund discounts and premiums are correlated with various measures 
of the costs of trying to arbitrage mispricing, including the composition of the funds’ portfolios 
and the level of interest rates. 
Table 7 lists nine papers that will appear in a special issue of the Journal of Financial 
Economics, all of which study the effects on asset prices of various kinds of frictions.  Several of 
these papers contain evidence similar to Pontiff’s in that the extent of apparent pricing anomalies 
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4  Long-Run Returns  
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) tracked the returns to “winner” and “loser” portfolios for 36 
months after portfolio formation and noted a slow drift upward in the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) of loser stocks that had performed poorly in the recent past.  They interpret this 
result as evidence of excessive pessimism following poor performance, making the stocks of 
loser firms profitable investments. 
Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) have argued that poor stock return performance will 
generally lead to higher leverage, because the value of the stock drops more than the value of the 
firm’s debt.  The increase in leverage should lead to higher risk and higher expected returns than 
would be reflected in risk estimates from a period before the drop in stock price.  They have also 
pointed out that many of the stocks earning the highest returns have very low prices, so that 
microstructure effects, such as a large proportional bid-ask spread, can reduce subsequent 
performance by large amounts. 
Returns to Firms Issuing Equity  
Using both CARs and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), Ritter (1991) measured 
post-IPO stock performance and concluded that IPO stocks yield below-normal returns in the 36 
months following the IPO.  He interpreted this result as evidence that investors become too 
optimistic about IPO firms, inflating the initial IPO return (from the IPO price to the secondary 
market trading price), and lowering subsequent returns.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) extended 
Ritter’s analysis using a sample of IPOs from 1970-1990. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) have studied the returns 
to IPO firms for the period 1975-1992 and found that underperformance is concentrated 
primarily in small firms with low book-to-market ratios.  They argue that this is the same  
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behavior as seen by Fama and French (1993) in their tests of their three-factor model and that the 
IPO anomaly is thus a manifestation of a general problem in pricing small firms with low book-
to-market ratios.  Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) also studied seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) and found that momentum, in addition to the Fama-French three-factor model, helps 
explain the behavior of returns after SEOs.  Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) have shown that 
the reduction in leverage that occurs when new equity is issued reduces subsequent equity risk 
exposure and thus contributes to the apparent unusual behavior of returns following SEOs. 
Schultz (2001) used simulations to study the behavior of abnormal return measures after 
events that are triggered by prior stock price performance.  For example, if a firm chooses to 
issue stock after its price has risen in the recent past, even if the stock price is fully rational, 
many of the popular measures of long-run abnormal returns will falsely reveal subsequent poor 
performance (he refers to this as ‘pseudo-market timing’).  The driving force behind his result is 
that the covariance between current excess returns and the number of future offerings is positive. 
Many papers have analyzed long-run stock returns following a variety of events and a 
large number of papers have also analyzed the properties of these long-run stock return tests and 
alternative hypotheses to explain these types of results. 
Fama (1998) has argued that the problem of measuring normal returns is particularly 
important when measuring long-run returns, because model problems that may be small in a day 
or a month can be compounded into larger apparent effects over three or five years.  He has also 
argued that most papers that attribute apparent abnormal stock returns to behavioral effects are 
not testing a specific alternative model.  Recent papers by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001), and Barberis and Shleifer (2002) are 
examples of models that make predictions for short- and long-run stock returns from irrational  
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investor behavior.  At this point, however, it is unclear whether these models have refutable 
predictions that differ from tests that have already been performed. 
Several papers have studied the statistical properties of long-run CARs and BHARs, 
including Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000).  All of these papers conclude that it is difficult to found long-run abnormal return 
measures that have well-specified statistical properties and reasonable power.  Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) argue that the calendar-time regression approach originally used by Jaffe (1974) 
and Mandelker (1974), and advocated by Fama (1998), provides more reliable inferences than 
long-run CARs or BHARs.  
Returns to Bidder Firms  
The returns to bidder firms’ stocks provide another example of potentially anomalous 
post-event behavior.  Since at least Asquith (1983), researchers have noted that there is a 
pronounced downward drift in the cumulative abnormal returns to the stocks of firms that are 
bidders in mergers.  One interpretation of this evidence is that bidders overpay and that it takes 
the market some time to gradually learn about this mistake. 
Schwert (1996) analyzed the returns to 790 NYSE and Amex-listed bidders for the period 
1975-1991 and found a negative drift of about 7% in the year following the announcement of the 
bid.  He concluded, however, that the explanation for this drift is the unusually good stock return 
performance of the bidder firms in the period prior to the bid.  To measure abnormal 
performance, he used a market model regression, 
 R it  = α i + β i Rmt + ε it,   (5) 
where Rit is the return to the bidder firm and Rmt is the return to the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio in period t, based on 253 daily returns in the year before the event analysis (which starts  
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six months before the first bid is announced).  Using the estimates of α i and β i, abnormal returns 
are estimated, averaged, and cumulated for the period from 127 trading days before the bid 
announcement to 253 trading days after the bid announcement, 
  ε ik = Rik  - α i - β i Rmk 
   790   
 ARk   =  Σ    ε ik 
    i=1 
          J   
 CARJ   =   Σ     ARk .  (6) 
     k=-127   
 
The dashed line in Fig. 3 represents the CAR to the bidder firms in (6).  It drifts 
downward after the first bid announcement  to  about –8%  a  year  afterwards.  The solid line in 
Fig. 3 represents a simple adjustment to the calculation of abnormal returns to bidders’ stocks:  
the intercept α i is set equal to zero.  This adjusted cumulative abnormal return does not have a 
noticeable drift in Fig. 3, which is consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.   
The adjustment eliminates the negative drift in abnormal returns because the estimated 
intercepts in the market model are systematically positive for bidder stocks in the year and a half 
before the bid, reflecting the fact that bidder firms are more likely to have recently experienced 
good performance, at least in terms of their stock prices.  This abnormally good performance 







































































































































Fig. 3.  Cumulative average abnormal returns to bidder firms' stocks from trading day -126 to 
+253 relative to the first bid for NYSE- and AMEX-listed target firms for the period 1975-1991.  
Market model parameters used to define abnormal returns are estimated using the CRSP value-
weighted portfolio for days -379 to -127.  The solid line shows the effect of setting the intercepts 
to zero, since the bidder firms seem to have abnormally high stock returns during the estimation 
period (shown by the dotted line that drifts downward from day -126 to day +253).  There are 
790 NYSE- or Amex-listed bidder firms that made the first bid for exchange-listed target firms 




Note that this does not mean that the bid somehow caused something bad to happen to the 
bidder firm; it simply means that bidders’ stock returns were normal in the period following the 
announcement of the bid.  The unusually positive performance of bidders’ stocks before the bid 
is an example of sample selection bias: the decisions of bidder firms to pursue acquisitions is 
correlated with their past stock price performance. 
It is important to note that it is not necessary to adjust the CAR for the sample of target 
firms.  The CAR for target firms rises gradually before the first bid announcement, reflecting bid 
anticipation, and jumps on the day of the announcement.  After that, it remains flat for the next 
year.  In contrast with the bidder firms, the target firms’ intercepts from the estimated market 
models are not unusually large, reflecting neither positive nor negative stock price performance 
in the year and half before they become targets. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) used the calendar-time portfolio method suggested by Fama 
(1998) to measure abnormal returns to acquiring firms.  They concluded that an equal-weighted 
portfolio of acquirers seems to earn negative abnormal returns over a three-year window 
following an acquisition, but that a value-weighted portfolio does not, using the Fama-French 
three-factor model in (2) as a benchmark.  This method of measuring the size and significance of 
abnormal returns is not affected by unusual prior performance in the same way as the CARs in 
Fig. 3. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) compared buy-and-hold returns to bidders’ stocks measured 
five years after acquisitions with returns to control firms that are matched on size and book-to-
market characteristics.  They found that stock mergers are followed by negative excess returns 
and cash tender offers are followed by positive excess returns.  Since the choice of payment by 
the bidder is similar to a choice concerning equity financing, the sample selection issues raised  
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by Schultz (2001) might affect the Loughran and Vijh (1997) results. 
 
5  Implications for Asset Pricing  
Consistent with Fama’s observation (1970, 1976, 1998) that tests of market efficiency are 
necessarily joint tests of a model of expected returns, evidence of anomalies is also potentially 
evidence of a short-coming in the implied asset-pricing model used for the test.  One example of 
this phenomenon that has created much activity in the finance literature in recent years is the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, which incorporates the size and book-to-market 
anomalies into the asset-pricing model. 
The Search for Risk Factors  
An obvious question that arises from empirically motivated adjustments of asset-pricing 
models is whether the new, extended model accurately describes equilibrium behavior, or is just 
a convenient offshoot of the anomalous findings that motivated the extension.  For example, the 
simple two-parameter CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) was motivated by portfolio 
theory.  Many people have developed extensions of theoretical asset-pricing models that include 
multiple factors (see, for example, Chapters 14 (Ross), 15 (Duffie), and 16 (Ferson)), although 
none of these models match closely with the empirical Fama-French model. 
On the other hand, as Fama and French (1993) have pointed out, some versions of 
multifactor models are vague about the risk factors that might lead to differences in expected 
returns across assets, so that their empirical proxies (size and book-to-market) may be reflecting 
equilibrium trade-offs between risk and expected return.  The Fama and French (1993, 1996) 
tests are consistent with their three-factor model being an adequate asset-pricing model, in the 
sense that the intercepts in their regression tests (measuring average abnormal returns to different  
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portfolio strategies) are not reliably different from zero.
11  
There is at least one other issue that must be addressed, however, before concluding that 
the three-factor model is an accurate equilibrium-pricing model.  As noted by MacKinlay (1995), 
the estimates of factor risk premiums from the Fama-French model seem very high, particularly 
for the book-to-market factor.  In some ways, this is analogous to the “equity premium puzzle” 
that has been frequently discussed in the macro-finance literature (see Campbell’s Chapter 19).  
If the estimates of risk premiums are too high (or too low) to be consistent with the underlying 
economic theory that motivates the model, the fact that average returns are linearly related to the 
risk factors is not sufficient to conclude that the market is efficient.  If the book-to-market 
premium is too high, as argued by MacKinlay, then returns vary too much with this risk factor.  
From this perspective, the evidence that the three-factor model provides a good linear model of 
risk and return may be just a fortuitous description of an anomaly. 
Conditional Asset Pricing  
The evidence on time-varying expected returns has obvious implications for the growing 
literature on conditional asset-pricing models.  On the other hand, the poor out-of-sample 
performance of some of the predictor variables raises questions about their role in asset prices. 
Excess Volatility 
I have not addressed the question raised by Shiller (1981a,b) of whether stock market 
volatility is “too high.”  His provocative papers on “excess volatility” stimulated many rebuttals, 
including Kleidon (1986) and Marsh and Merton (1986),  that raised questions about the validity 
and robustness of his statistical methods. While I have written many papers on the behavior of 
                                                 
11An exception is that the Fama-French (1993) portfolio of the smallest firms with the lowest book-to-market 
ratios has a reliably negative intercept.  Also, as mentioned above, the Fama-French model does not seem to explain 
the momentum evidence.  
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stock volatility, some of which raise questions about why volatility varies over time as much as it 
does (e.g., Schwert (1989)), I do not believe that this literature is closely linked with the 
literature on anomalies and market efficiency.  In my 1991 review of Shiller (1989), I argue that 
Shiller’s research on excess volatility is really a test of a particular valuation model and provides 
no guidance on how to identify or profit from mispricing. 
The Role of Behavioral Finance 
Finally, there is the issue of whether the findings in the anomalies literature can be 
combined with behavioral theories from the psychology literature to create new asset-pricing 
theories that combine economic equilibrium concepts with psychological concepts to create an 
improved asset-pricing model (see Chapter 18 by Barberis and Thaler).  My impression, to date, 
is that the attempts to proceed in this direction have produced models that might explain some of 
the existing anomalies, but they make no predictions for observable behavior that have not 
already been tested extensively.
12  In other words, the new behavioral theories have not yet made 
predictions that are refutable with new tests.  Going beyond the stage of building theories to 
explain the “stylized facts” that already exist will be a significant challenge.  
 
6  Implications for Corporate Finance  
What implications do market efficiency and anomalies have for corporate finance?  The 
standard textbook treatment of corporate finance in an efficient market (for example, Brealey and 
Myers (2000)) tells firms to choose projects that maximize value, and perhaps choose capital 
structures or dividend policies that create value, but to take the market prices of their stocks and 
bonds as given and more or less correct. 
                                                 
12Fama (1998) is less sympathetic to the ability of these new models to explain existing anomalies.  
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Firm Size and Liquidity  
How would the kinds of anomalies discussed above change this advice, if at all?  To the 
extent that the small-firm effect is real, firms that merge and become larger would have a lower 
cost of capital, and therefore a higher value.  But this kind of financial synergy is hard to believe.  
In fact, it raises the question of whether firm size somehow proxies for a more fundamental 
source of risk or value. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) have argued that firm size proxies for the illiquidity of 
the stock and that higher transactions costs for small firms raise the required gross return so that 
net expected returns are equalized, given the risk of the stock.  In their empirical work, they 
found that the cross-sectional dispersion in average returns across portfolios of NYSE stocks 
sorted on bid-ask spreads is similar to the dispersion in average returns across portfolios sorted 
on risk estimates.  From this perspective, size is not a risk factor, but rather a proxy for 
differential transactions costs.
13  Thus, actions that increase the liquidity of a firm’s stock would 
reduce required returns and increase the stock price if such actions were costless.  Decisions on 
whether the firm should undertake policies that increase liquidity depend on whether the benefits 
exceed the costs.  There has been much recent work on the linkages between market 
microstructure, asset pricing, and corporate finance (see Chapter 21 by Easley and O’Hara).  
Book-to-Market Effects 
Fama and French interpret the book-to-market ratio as an indicator of “value” versus 
“growth” stocks, and the HML risk factor as reflecting “distress risk.”  In their tests, firms with 
high book-to-market ratios or risk sensitivities are often firms whose value has fallen recently 
                                                 
13The apparent disappearance of the size effect discussed in 2.1, if true, would be problematic for the liquidity 
effect unless small-capitalization stocks have relatively low transaction costs in recent years.  
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because of bad performance.  These firms are more likely to suffer financial distress costs in 
future periods if further bad news hits. 
To the extent that Fama and French (1993) are correct that SMB and HML reflect priced 
risk factors, then reducing a firm’s exposure to these types of risk would lower the expected 
return on its stock, and therefore, its cost of capital.  Such a change would not increase the value 
of the firm, however, so there is no obvious prescription for managerial behavior. 
If Daniel and Titman (1997) are correct that firms with lower book-to-market ratios have 
lower expected returns, holding risk constant, then corporate financial policies designed to lower 
B/M would improve firm value by lowering the cost of capital.  Of course, holding book value 
constant, this is equivalent to increasing the market value of the stock, which is generally good 
for shareholders (and not a new insight). 
In the corporate finance literature, the book-to-market ratio has been interpreted as a 
measure of the type of investment opportunities that are available to the firm.  For example, 
Smith and Watts (1992) have interpreted high book-to-market firms as those with “assets-in-
place” and low book-to-market firms as those with relatively more “growth options.”  From this 
perspective, the fact that accounting book values make no attempt to measure the value of 
growth options drives the cross-sectional dispersion in book-to-market ratios.  Interpreted this 
way, the book-to-market ratio is exogenous and reflects the investment opportunity set facing the 
firm.  It would not make sense, for example, to advise firms to sell assets in place and invest in 
growth options just to lower book-to-market and, from the perspective of Daniel and Titman, to 
lower the cost of capital. 
There has also been a substantial literature using Tobin’s Q-ratio (a close relative of 
book-to-market) as a proxy for the efficiency with which managers use corporate assets.  Dating  
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back at least to Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), high book-to-market ratios have been 
interpreted as indicating poor performance and possibly the existence of agency problems 
between stockholders and managers. 
The fact that the same empirical proxy has been used in three quite different ways raises 
serious questions about interpreting any of this evidence in a normative way to give firms or 
managers advice about corporate financial policy. 
Slow Reaction to Corporate Financial Policy  
Much of the literature studying long-horizon returns focuses on corporate financial policy 
decisions such as IPOs, seasoned equity offerings, share repurchases, merger bids, and so forth.  
A common theme in this literature is that there is a slow drift in the stock price of the firm after 
the event, apparently reflecting a gradual process of learning the good or bad news associated 
with the event.  A slow reaction is inconsistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. 
As mentioned above, the papers that have systematically studied the behavior of long-
horizon performance measures found that they have low power and unreliable statistical 
properties in most situations.  Even if one were to accept the premise that the market learns very 
slowly about the implications of changes in corporate financial policy, the uncertainty associated 
with the future price performance for an individual firm over a period of one to five years is so 
great that it would be senseless to advise that firms choose their financial policies so as to take 
advantage of market mispricing that is only corrected after five years. 
 
7 Conclusions   
This chapter highlights some interesting findings that have emerged from empirical 
research on the behavior of asset prices and discusses the implications of these findings for the  
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way academics and practitioners use financial theory.  In the process, I have replicated and 
extended some puzzling findings that have been called anomalies because they do not conform 
with the predictions of accepted models of asset pricing.   
One of the interesting findings from the empirical work in this chapter is that many of the 
well-known anomalies in the finance literature do not hold up in different sample periods.  In 
particular, the size effect and the value effect seem to have disappeared after the papers that 
highlighted them were published.  At about the same time, practitioners began investment 
vehicles that implemented the strategies implied by the academic papers. 
The weekend effect and the dividend yield effect also seem to have lost their predictive 
power after the papers that made them famous were published.  In these cases, however, I am not 
aware of any practitioners who have tried to use these anomalies as a major basis of their 
investment strategy. 
The small-firm turn-of-the-year effect became weaker in the years after it was first 
documented in the academic literature, although there is some evidence that it still exists.   
Interestingly, however, it does not seem to exist in the portfolio returns of practitioners who 
focus on small-capitalization firms. 
Likewise, the evidence that stock market returns are predictable using variables such as 
dividend yields or inflation is much weaker in the periods after the papers that documented these 
findings were published. 
All of these findings raise the possibility that anomalies are more apparent than real.  The 
notoriety associated with the findings of unusual evidence tempts authors to further investigate 
puzzling anomalies and later to try to explain them.  But even if the anomalies existed in the 
sample period in which they were first identified, the activities of practitioners who implement  
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strategies to take advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the anomalies to disappear (as 
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